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I . GENERAL 
UNCtA 
Under Contract AF-l8(600)-6!>2 and dated December 17, 1953, the Bell 
Telephone Laboratories has submitted to the Air Research and Development 
Command a report entitled "The Ground Environment Problem in Air Defense: 
An Appraisal of the Lincoln Transition System." 
The purpose of that report is to call military attention to possible 
Transition System shortcomings in time to take corrective actions. In 
doing this, the report is very helpful. In addition to raising some new 
points, it supports and emphasizes the importance of several programs 
which have recently been started by the Air Force and by Project Lincoln, 
Persons associated with the Transition System feel that the report is 
correct in two of its three principal points, but that the third and several 
minor points are based on misunderstanding. 
As we see it, the report contains three central themes: 
A. Deficiencies in the Observation Phase (after Observation 
has been redefined as discussed in Chapter II of this 
paper). 
We agree with the concern shown in the report 
for the inadequacy of the radar data, feel that this 
is the most important and constructive point which 
the report emphasizes, and feel that the importance of 
improving the observation (radar) phase of the system 
justifies a separate recommendation. 
B. Desire for More Cape Cod Test Results. 
In this, we agree on the importance of additional 
test data to establish a quantitative foundation for the 
Transition System. Data already exists on some of the 
points raised in the report; on the others, a high 
priority program is directed toward obtaining necessary 
data. 
Points A and B will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
C. Authors' Preference for Decentralized Data Processing 
(which is called Observation in the report). 
We feel that the borderline between centralization 
and decentralization is ill-defined, and that the argu-
ments presented in the BTL report do not necessarily 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.
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justify the conclusions. Some further work is now 
being undertaken at Lincoln to investigate part of 
the "decentralization" problem. A fuller exposition 
by the writers of the BTL report would be welcome. 
There is some confusion concerning other areas of 
application. This will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter V. 
To a lesser extent, the report raises operational and economic 
questions about the Transition System such as cost, personnel require-
ments, subdivision of military functions, purpose and areas of application, 
degree of departure frcm past practice, and proper size of basic building 
block. With some of these opinions we agree, but others seem to result 
directly from basic operational and economic philosophies in which the 
authors of the report differ from the designers of the Transition System. 
With some of these philosophies we agree, and we differ with others. 
These are treated more fully in Chapters II, III, IV, and V. 
In the remainder of this memorandum-
Chapter II discusses some points of basic philosophy 
and viewpoint on which the Transition System 
is based and with which the authors of the 
BTL report seem often to disagree. 
Chapter H I discusses those points in which we agree 
with the BTL report. 
Chapter IV lists some points of disagreement and errors 
of fact in the BTL report. 
Chapter V discusses an important area in which there 
is a lack of common understanding. 
^ 
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II. BASIC PHILQ30PHI AND VIEWPOINT. 
Evaluation of an air defense system must be carried out within 
some framework of philosophies and beliefs which define the objectives, 
resources and performance with which the system must be compatible* It 
is in this area of underlying philosophy and viewpoint that some disagree-
ments with the BTL report arise. These will be discussed under: 
A. Grouping of Air Defense Functions. 
B. Scope of System. 
C. Personnel and Cost. 
D. Relation to Present Practice and Size of 
Basic Building Block. 
E. Areas of Transition System Application. 
However, it should be noted that the worth of an air defense system is 
judged not by its conformity to some arbitrary guiding philosophy, but 
in how well it "makes air defense." 
A. Grouping of Air Defense Functions. 
On Page 3* the authors divide military functions 
into three groups: Observation, Command, Guidance* 
By omitting Data Processing as a separate group a con-
fusion is created which persists throughout the balance 
of the report. "Data Processing" is as separable as 
the other groups of functions. In many civilian and 
military tasks Data Processing is more closely associ-
ted with Command and Guidance than with Observation* 
However, grouping Data Processing with Observation, the 
authors are naturally led to several doubtful conclusions, 
including the one that data should be processed at the 
radar set where, indisputably, observation must take 
place. We believe that a more plausible and instructive 
grouping would be as follows (without thereby implying 
the geographical relationship of major or sub tasks): 
1, Observation 
a. Radar Signal Detection. 
b* Direction Finding Data. 
c. Ground Observer Corps Reports. 
.> ts"* s*s> 
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A. Grouping of Air Defense Functions - 1.Observation continued: 
d. Flight Plans. 
e. Height Measurement* 
f. Passive Detection of Enemy Signals. 
2. Data Processing 













a. Decision on Identification. 
b. Threat Evaluation. 
c. Weapon Assignment. 
Guidance 
a* Interceptor and Missile Mid-course 
Guidance. 
b. Local Weapon Target Designation. 
c. Interceptor Return-to-Base. 
Each group of functions depends on results from the preceding groups, 
The first two groups (Observation and Data Processing) can be considered 
as service functions for the end-result groups (Command and Guidance). 
It is easy to criticize the presently existing air defense system for its 
deficiencies in Command and Guidance; this is, however, the focusing of 
attention on effect rather than cause. 
The gross shortcomings of the present air defense system lie about 
equally in the Observation and the Data Processing groups. Both need 
many-fold improvement, and the improvement of p«eOjJ.one will give only 
^ 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.
L-135-1 -£-
partial air defense enhancement. ' The radar, part" of the present Observa-
tion system is deficient J J l N O * - 0 ^ 
Low altitude cover (needing more radar sets closely 
spaced because of earth's curvature). 
High altitude cover. 
Ability to see moving targets in ground and see clutter. 
Resolution. 
Blip-scan ratio. 
Speed of antenna rotation. 
Reliability. 
Discrimination against weather. 
Present Data Processing is deficient in: 
Capacity. 
Speed. 
Freedom from error. 
Accuracy. 
Clarity of Presentation. 
Means for coordinated group action. 
The present manual Data Processing would be nearly incapable of 
absorbing more information from the Observation phase, but, by contrast, 
a better data processing system should make improved use of presently 
available radar data. The Lincoln Transition System attempts to con-
centrate on breaking the Data Processing bottleneck, while simultaneously 
efforts are being made to improve the "Observational" process. As the 
BTL report stresses, full potentiality of the system can not be realized 
until both of these programs have been completed. 
B. Scope and Flexibility of Air Defense Ground Environment. 
An over-simplification of the air defense problem 
may result in a corresponding over-simplification of the 
solution. We believe this has happened several places in 
^ 0 ^ 
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B, Scope and Flexibility of Air Defense Ground Environment 
Continued: 
the BTL report as a result of concentrating on only the 
radar as the data source and the manned interceptor as 
the weapon. Air defense is not a single-line information 
flow circuit but has many inputs, multiple outputs and 
many inter-acting cross-currents of information within 
the system. 
We prefer to think of the Transition System, not as 
a certain specific information flow channel (the present 
large radar, SDV link, orthodox digital computer, display 
and interceptor of the BTL report), but as a matrix into 
which all detectors, many types of data transmission, 
missiles, picket ships, and weapons can all be fitted,. 
Effective use of the gap filler and "Muldar" type of 
short-range all-altitude radar seems, for example, to be 
well fitted to the Transition System but ill fitted to 
alternate proposals in the BTL report. 
The Transition System must have flexibility to cope 
with substantial changes in threat, observing equipment, 
forms of data transmission, and weapons and to serve and 
include all of these, not just one combination. For 
example, the BTL report discusses SDV data encoding (which 
has a valuable and impoi'Uuib place in the ayaiem) to "one 
relative exclusion of other automatic data encoding 
systems which encode radar data to higher accuracies and 
conserve bandwidth to a greater degree than does SDV. 
These are now in late stages of development after 
several years of study and basic experiment and will be 
operationally tested this summer. 
As, pointed out in TM-20*, the Transition System is 
the transition between the present system (with present 
radar sets) and the Future System (with improved Observa-
tion as well as Data Processing). Plans for improved 
radar sets are under way with more emphasis still needed. 
"A Proposal for Air Defense System Evolution: The Transition Phase." 
Lincoln Laboratory Technical Memorandum No. 20, Second Draft, dated 
2 January 1°J>3. 
,C,v 
^ p-d& 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.
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Continued: 
After the transition phase, improvement in data observa-
tion will be the most necessary next step. 
Since not all possible forms of this improvement 
can now be foreseen, we must question the philosophy of 
Pages 13 and lit of the BTL report, where it is implied 
that flexibility for future development will be needed 
in the Command and Guidance phases but not in the 
Observation and Data Processing phases. 
We believe that Observation and Data Processing 
must be adaptable to improvements and therefore require 
the same degree of flexibility as Command and Guidance. 
Personnel and Cost. 
In discussing personnel and cost* we feel the BTL 
report is founded on a different concept of the motivation 
for the system than that which has inspired the develop-
ment. From the report (Page 23), "It seems clear that 
the most powerful tools possible are needed to solve the 
air defense problem and that, in.particular, mechanization 
is needed to economize on the expenditure of human 
effort in an essentially standby function during what may 
be many years of cold war." We believe that emphasis 
should be primarily to "solve the air defense problem" 
and desirably, but quite secondarily, to reduce the 
number of people. We consider it fortunate that an in-
creased air defense capability appears to be possible 
without requiring any increase in the present number of 
personnel. 
The report implies that the Transition System is 
very expensive. Here the guiding philosophy should be 
based on a relative, not absolute, scale. On an absolute 
scale, the system might seem to be prohibitively expensive. 
On a relative scale, the entire electronic ground environ-
ment (including radars) will total less than ten percent 
of the cost of the weapon systems which it controls. If 
the Transition System can produce a ten percent increase 
in weapon effectiveness, it will break even; it will be 
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C. Personnel and Cost Continued; 
In implying that the Transition System is expensive, 
the report further implies that an unspecified alternative 
system can be cheaper. It is our belief that all of the 
alternative systems proposed to date will be less effective 
than the Transition System and more costly. 
D. Relationship of System to Present Practice and Size of 
Building Block, 
From the viewpoint of the BTL report, the Transition 
System is (Page 2£) a "complete break from present operating 
doctrine and practice." We submit that, relative to the 
system improvements anticipated, only small departures 
from the present operating doctrine and operating practice 
are necessary. The basic unit of the Transition System 
is handled like the basic unit at present, with similar 
duties assigned to the Air Surveillance Officer, the 
Identification Officer, the Sub-sector Commander, and the 
Intercept Director. The Direction Center and the Combat 
Center perform substantially the same functions as at 
present. 
True, the command area of the Combat Center has been 
increased four-fold but this hardly constitutes a complete 
break with the past because military units customarily en-
compass a wide range and variability of sizes. Some con-
solidation through better data processing and transmission 
can hardly be more radical than past changes following 
the introduction of the telephone, radio, or radar. 
Wc have encountered no difficulty in trailing Air 
Force airmen and officers to operate the Cape Cod System0 
Basic skills of present Air Force personnel will carry 
over from the present system to the FSQ-7 Information 
Central. The "Thinking" and "Decision" jobs (evaluation, 
assignment, tactics) remain the same. Many individual 
tasks are simplified in the same way that assembly tasks 
are subdivided and clarified in making the change from ft 
model shop to an assembly line. 
The inherent flexibility of the Transition System 
computer makes it easy to adopt drastic departures from 
present day operating doctrine if desired. However, opera-
ting doctrine is the prerogative of the Air Defense Command, 
and the suggested doctrines have been studied by thenu 
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Relationship of System to Present Practice and Size of 
Building Block Continuedt 
Undoubtedly, operating doctrine will be modified as the 
Cape Cod tests progress and will continue to evolve with 
military operating .experience. Lincoln should provide 
for such evolution; the Air Force will control it» 
Areas of Transition System Application. 
The report seems to exclude several important areas 
of application for the Transition System. It, therefore, 
concludes that additional new development is needed in 
these areas along with ways of making this new develop-
ment compatible with the Transition System. On Page 11, 
we find, "The system is intended primarily for areas of 
high traffic density;" and on Page 26, "Hence, the 
System itself must ultimately be integrated 
into a larger defense system including advanced early 
warning and tracking systems and combat areas where 
traffic density does not justify a highly centralized 
system." 
The meaning of "traffic density" is unclear, but it 
should be pointed out that selection of the Transition 
System is not directly affected by normal peacetime commercial 
and military air traffic. The system should be installed 
where there is threat of an air battle. It should be in-
stalled in any area which is to be chosen as a battle area 
and to which a significant allocation of weapons has been 
or is to be made. Again, the criteria might well be the 
relationship between weapon cost in an area and the ex-
pected enhancement in weapon effectiveness from an improved 
electronic ground environment. 
With respect to a close tracking band (100 miles or 
more) beyond the weapon range, it is highly desirable 
that Observation radars covering this band be integrated 
as part of the Transition System (combine the first and 
second layers of the onion analogy on Page 6), 
If the area is not manned with adequate defensive 
weapons to conduct an air battle, the role of the Transition 
System,must be studied again. Conferences with the ADC 
indicated that the Transition System is now being considered 
only for those regions which will have defensive weapons 
systems. 
v « ^ ' 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.
[HCLnOO 
AREAS OF AGREEMENT 
3ii most recommendations and observations in the report, the Idncoln 
Laboratory agrees with the findings of the BTL report. 
A. The Observation Function. 
The report raises serious questions about the short-
comings of the input data to the system. The source of 
radar data is the most vulnerable part of the system, 
and it is here that one is working with the minimum 
signal thresholds and the minimum signal to noise ratios 
that occur at any point in the system. One must work 
subject to the natural limitations of resolution, range, 
earth's curvature and clutter as well as jamming by the 
enemy. If the observation function can be adequately 
performed, there is, in theory, no excuse for failing 
in the succeeding functions of data processing, command 
and. guidance. To obtain adequate data many radar improve-
ments are needed and most seem possible to achieve: 
1. Low altitude coverage. 
2. More power to see small targets. 
3. High altitude coverage. 
U. Better MTI. 
5. Improved weather discrimination. 
6. Improved resolution for better weapon control. 
7. Increased antenna rotational speed. 
In addition to getting more useful information in the 
radar returns, improvements are also necessary in the 
way in which this data is observed and made ready for use 
by the data processing equipment. 
This agreement concerning observational deficiencies 
must be tempered with the realization that these deficiencies 
are common to all air defense systems whir.h use radar data. 
B. Selective Bandwidth Compression at the Radar. 
The arguments for taking advantage d£ the potential 
information at the radar are most convincing. In truth, 
this became apparent a year or more ago when the Transition 
^ C N > : 
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B. Selective Bandwidth Compression at the Radar Continued: 
System was initially conceived as requiring the 
interim use of present long range radars. At that time, 
it was recognized that a program would have to be under-
taken to selectively compress radar bandwidth. The SDV 
was initially designed for the short range radar where 
the data compression was consistent with resolution 
capabilities of the basic radar. It will continue to be 
useful with interior radars where overlap is sufficient 
to make the longest ranges unnecessary. However, SDV 
is a marginal device for high accuracy guidance on the 
outer limits of the heavy radars especially on the 
perimeter. The compression of radar bandwidth will have 
to be done in a manner which retains the accuracy of the 
original data and discriminates against false information. 
Apparatus for selecting the coordinates of the radar 
return to an accuracy consistent with that of the original 
information has already been demonstrated for single 
targets on the CPS-6B and for a limited number of targets 
on the Mark X. The combination of this beam-splitting 
technique with noise and clutter rejecting devices will 
be operationally demonstrated this summer (1°J>U)« The 
area of disagreement is, therefore, one of technique 
rather than of principle, since we propose to use beam-
splitting, selective information encoding, and trans-
mission, but to retain the economic and operational 
advantages of tracking at the Direction Center. The 
measure of disagreement at this point is concerned with 
the need for additional equipment and personnel to dis-
charge this tracking function at the radar, and the 
degree of added compression under high track density 
conditions which could be achieved by human intervention 
at the radar. 
C. Magnitude of the Program. 
The report correctly calls attention to the magnitude 
of the Transition System development, design and installa-
tion programs. The Transition System can hope to progress 
on schedule only if all interested persons provide their 
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Test Program. 
The report properly stresses the urgency and importance 
of the test program being conducted on the Cape Cod Exper-
mental System. The Lincoln Laboratory will carry this 
forward rapidly. 
Automatic Tracking. 
The report agrees with the idea of automatic tracking 
of radar data both explicitly as done in the Lincoln 
Transition System and implicitly by suggesting alternative 
data processing techniques which also use automatic track-
ing. This is encouraging since the concept of automatic 
tracking has been one of the most controversial technical 
issues in the past. 
The Application of General Purpose Digital Computers, 
On Pages 13 and 1H* the BTL report concurs in the 
utility and growth potential of the general purpose 
digital computer. It emphasizes the need for easy 
conversation between computers. This, too, is an en-
couraging endorsement of a subject of past controversy. 
* > > 
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IV. POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT. 
^ 
There are a number of points in the BTL report with which we 
disagree. We believe that these arise for reasons given earlier. 
A. Disagreement with Presentation or Implications of 
Report. " 
1. Effort Justified in Radar Data Processing. 
The report on Page 1$ correctly states that 
the processing of track data occupies about 
half of the central computing time. The 
implication is incorrect that this is un-
justifiably high. 
The generation of a clear, unconfused 
track situation is the most difficult and 
subtle part of the air defense problem, 
short of the actual observation of the airplane 
itself. This viewpoint is not inconsistent 
with alternative proposals which have devoted 
the major part of their equipment and personnel 
to the tracking problem and little to subsequent 
data processing. By using all of the available 
information in the system, such as aircraft 
identification, flight plans, orders transmitted 
to interceptors and knowledge of radar coverage, 
it is believed that some compensation can be 
made for deficiencies in the actual radar 
observation by aircraft. It should not seem 
surprising that half the capacity of the data 
processing part of the system should be devoted 
to the largest and most difficult task which 
must be accomplished. The same section of the 
report states: "In fact, there are no obvious 
technical or operational reasons why the ob-
servational and guidance functions should be 
centralized as the command functions must be." 
We would point out that there are no obvious 
reasons for the reverse, and that a careful 
examination of the cost and complexity of the 
two systems seems to show that the data process-
ing is more closely allied to the command and 
guidance functions than it is to observation. 
The report presents no technical Jiis*tification 
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1* Effort Justified in Radar Data Processing 
Continued! 
that decentralizing the data processing would 
lead to either less equipment or higher quality 
performance. This is further discussed in 
Section V. below. 
2. Amount of Information in a Radar Scan, 
The report makes calculations on the amount 
of information in a radar scan. These are mis-
leading and appear erroneous as a result of 
confusing "resolution" and "precision." In 
the radar signal, the calculation seems to 
conclude that because one can do beam-splitting 
to one-fifth of the bearawidth, that there can 
therefore be five resolvable airplanes in one 
beaimridth, at a particular range. 
Our calculations of the number of resolvable 
cells in a single radar frame (AN/FPS-3) indicate 
o 
(i2° cells in azimuth) x (200 miles range cells) 
1.4° 1/U mile pulses 
or about 200,000 resolvable cells. We are agreed 
with the Bell Laboratories that even this number 
of resolvable cells, although occupied in relative-
ly low densities (i. e, 2$%) exceeds the capacity 
of all presently known data processing systems. 
A premise must therefore be established con-
cerning the total number of objects which must 
be considered by the data processing system. If 
we make the premise that as many as 200 aircraft 
are in view of the ground radar (BTL on Page 8 
suggests that 60 air objects may be more reasonable) 
and that thex'e are 5 times as many other possible 
extraneous objects to be considered for each target 
(BTL on Page 9 suggests a 1 mile by 1 mile search 
box which can contain only k resolvable cells 
beyond l|0 miles) and that each aircraft or other 
source of information be specified to 22 bits 
(an increase in precision of 16 times in azimuth 
and U times in range over SDV), then the total 
rate at which information is being generated is 
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2, Amount of Information in a Radar Scan Continued: 
only about 2500 bits per second at present 
radar frame rates. Furthermore, we are confident 
that these capabilities are within reach of the 
proposed data encoding system and well within 
the capacity of an AN/FSQ-7 to process. 
3. Overlapping Radars. 
On Page 20 of the report, the second paragraph 
implies that the Transition System will and must 
track interceptor and target with separate 
radar sets. The Transition System can do this 
when necessary and this point distinguishes it 
from other systems. However, there is no necessity 
nor desire for doing the tracking in this way when 
one radar set is receiving good data on both 
target and interceptor. 
U. Radar Data Overload. 
In reference to the input buffer drum, on 
Page 20, fourth paragraph, in speaking of a way 
to eliminate input buffer drum jamming by a 
particular radar, the report states: "Practical 
effectiveness of this expedient is yet to be 
determined.• It should be pointed out that in 
all the operations thus far there has not as 
yet been any need for the expedient. Its 
development consists at most of providing a 
counter, which is one of the simplest digital 
techniques present in the system. 
Errors of Fact. 
We feel that there are several errors of fact in the 
report. This is recognized by the authors on Page 13: 
"It is to be emphasized that the appraisal of the system 
ventured here is to be regarded as tentative and based 
upon broad system concept rather than upon a large amount 
of detailed factual knowledge." We do believe, however, 
that an evaluation and a broad system concept depend 
intimately upon the accuracy of details and that such errors 
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1* History 
The report states that all development work 
toward the Transition System has occurred since 
19£l. While it is true that the first field 
experiments with automatic processing of real 
radar returns from real aircraft were conducted 
in the spring of 1°J>1, this necessitated a con-
siderable amount of preparatory work. Even if 
we ignore four years of related equipment design 
and of development of data links, and a similar 
period of study and discussion and evaluation of 
the use of digital computer equipment in military 
data processing, the present schedule still calls 
for installation of a first operational sector 
at least seven years after the beginning of the 
design of the experimental equipraent. The authors 
are right that this is a short time for a system 
of this extent, but it is not as short a time as 
the report implies. 
2« Automatic Hand-over and Cross Telling. 
On Page Hi, the report states that there is 
no automatic hand-over procedure between computer 
centers or between air divisions. This is in-
correct since equipment and circuits for fully 
automatic operation are included as part of the 
FSQ-7 design. 
3» Tracking Search Box. 
The eight-mile square tracking search box 
discussed at the bottom of Page 18 does not in 
any way commit one to use all of the data and 
noise which might occur within this area. It is 
an area taken large enough to include all returns 
of possible interest even after a target miss due 
to a low blip scan ratio from the radar set. A 
small search box is placed within the larger and 
various criteria tested for the existence of data 
in one or the other, or both or neither of the 
boxes• 
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U. Combining Radar Data* 
In the last paragraph on Page 19, the state-
ment is made that superposition of radar data 
reduces the signal to noise ratio. This is in-
correct because the radar returns are identified 
by source before being placed on the input buffer 
drums. The computer can and will have access to 
the data from individual radars separately so 
that the comments about decreasing signal to 
noise ratio are true only if th# effect is found 
to be sufficiently unimportant and to be ignorable. 
5. Mapping Operator. 
Page 20 states that the map masking operation 
relies on the uncontrolled judgment of the ±Dr 
dividual operator to a possibly dangerous extent. 
Operators are under the guidance of a supervisor 
and individual judgment seems no more dangerous 
here than at many other points in the air defense 
system, and is certainly far less dangerous than 
that exercised by the human tracker suggested in 
alternative systems. Despite our lack of reserva-
tions on the danger of this procedure, basic 
experiments have been made on mechanizing this 
function in order to minimize personnel. 
6. Slant Range Correction. 
The second paragraph on Page 20 incorrect ly 
s ta tes tha t the lack of s lant range correction 
may cause t rouble . The FSQ-7 system w i l l make 
s lan t range correction on a l l radar returns 
where th i s correction i s s igni f icant . 
7. Buffer Drum Capacity. 
In several places the report states that the 
input buffer drum represents a constriction on 
the flow of radar data. This is untrue since 
the input buffer drum can handle more data than 
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V. DECENTRALIZED TRACKING. 
A* Decentralized Tracking for Continental Defense. 
The authors of the BTL report strongly favor the 
decentralization of track data processing to the radar 
site. We feel that this partially results from not 
clearly distinguishing between the observation and data 
processing functions and from not having in mind any firm 
idea of what the suggestion implies in equipment complexity. 
They suggested that the decentralized tracking could 
give some unit capability at the individual radar set. It 
would certainly be a step in that direction but some semblance 
of a complete system would be necessary before the amount 
of unit capability could be determined. In particular, we 
are agreed with BTL on the increased areas in which air 
battles will be fought with increased aircraft speeds. 
Unit capability in face of such possibility must be questioned. 
The likelihood that isolation of a radar set can occur due 
to communications failure should be studied carefully by 
the ADES organization and a value on continuity of service 
established by ADC. With this information an adequate stand-
by communications system can be specified and we believe 
that adequate standby communications will be more practical 
and less expensive than providing standby operational 
facilities at the radar. 
The suggestion that such decentralization would be 
simpler and more efficient has in the past been untrue 
of those systems which have progressed to the point 
where complexity could be evaluated. We believe that the 
excessive complexity in proportion to the return achieved 
is the reason that such a system does not now exist in 
usable form. A simple comparison of the number of tubes 
per track in different systems is frequently in error 
because of the failure of some systems designers to 
appreciate the magnitude of coordinating the tasks of 
track initiators, track monitors, and track users in 
large systems. 
The suggestion of higher performance for the 
decentralized system, we believe, is also erroneous and 
the scant comparative information seems to so indicate. 
Almost any kind of automatic tracking can be made to 
function under conditions of one hurvtred percent 
radar blip-scan ratio, low noise, and low traffic 
density. It is under the often prevailing non-ideal 
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conditions that automatic tracking becomes difficult 
and its solution subtle. Here we believe the rigidity, 
inflexibility, and naivete of the special purpose equip-
ment is dangerous. 
The authors are right to the extent that some 
special equipment will be needed at the radar set. 
Video integration is needed with the SDV transmitter; 
a beam splitter will probably be required at the long 
range radars; under some circumstances, radar mapping 
may be employed. All these techniques fit within the 
framewbrk of the Transition System and should be much 
simpler than any full reliance on tracking channels at 
the radar. 
Since, according to the report, the decentralized 
systems are still very much in the experimental stage, 
it seems unlikely that they can arrive in time to be a 
part of the Transition System. Why such systems should 
still be in the experimental stage is interesting specu-
lation. To our knowledge, the systems which employ varia-
tions of analog track-while-scan units were started 
before 19h.7 and have not as yet been successfully applied 
to the air defense problem. 
As stated before, the inherent difficulties in the 
system arise in the simple observation function and not 
in where the data processing is done. With the introduction 
of gap-filler radars and the trend toward the multiple, 
short-range, all-altitude radar, the prospect of local 
data processing becomes even less attractive. 
Decentralized Tracking for Non-Contiguous Defense. 
The HTL report has recommended further that de-
centralized data processing be developed for isolated 
bases and other air defense situations. There is some 
uncertainty regarding the specific areas of application 
which were intended. It would be most helpful in the 
formulation of a development program if these ideas 
could be expanded to specify the particular situations 
for which decentralized data processing should be developed 
with illustrations from present and future operational 
concepts. 
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C. Lincoln Laboratory Program in Decentralized Data 
Processing."" 
To the extent such a decentralized data processing 
system for continental defense is compatible with the 
Transition System in techniques and concept, we are in 
favor of, and have such a program under way. This equip-
ment is intended to encode data more accurately, conserve 
transmission bandwidth to a greater degree than SDV, and 
minimize the transmission of useless information. We 
believe that this fulfills the spirit of the BTL recommenda-
tion (within economic constraints) as applied to continental 
defense planning. 
Beyond this, the Lincoln Laboratory would be happy to 
undertake the study of such specific alternative systems 
as may be proposed for any other specified situations. 
This commitment will have to be examined in light of 
specific proposals to insure that studies will not inter-
fere with our primary program for making the Transition 
System operational and to establish that Lincoln Laboratory 
can make important contributions on such proposals in the 






APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.
